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In Canada the road to riches has often been paved with corporate mergers. 
Max Aitken, for instance, made his fortune that way before the First World 
War and retired to England to play at politics. He was not alone. The years 
after 1909 saw a vast increase in the number of mergers and amalgamations, 
and those who reaped the largest rewards were a breed of company promoter 
new to the Canadian scene.1 Not necessarily possessing large personal for-
tunes, these men learned how to exert maximum leverage with borrowed 
funds, how to make real money stick to their fingertips while reams of gilt-
edged paper passed through their hands. Their success depended less upon 
traditional business values like prudence, efficiency and hard work than upon 
glib speech and deft manipulation. Any proposition which could turn a 
good profit appealed to them, but a select group of Canadians specialized 
in electrical utility promotions: William Mackenzie, James Ross, Rodolphe 
Forget, B. F. Pearson and E. A. Robert. They found attractive opportunities 
aplenty. By 1900 almost every sizable city in eastern Canada had an electrified 
street railway earning a solid profit. The power was generated by steam plants. 
but these astute entrepreneurs recognized hydroelectricity as the wave of the 
future for lighting and industrial purposes. Although costly to develop, hydro 
was markedly cheaper to produce than thermal power. These men reasoned 
that the acquisition of a waterpower site and its integration with a street rail-
way could be a money-spinner. The railway would absorb a large base load 
1 Between 1909 and 1912 there were 58 corporate mergers in Canada capitalized at $484,000,000; 
see H. G. Stapells, "The Recent Consolidation Movement in Canadian Industry" (unpub-
lished M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1922), pp. 12-13, 18-34. Aitken's biographer 
explains that he profited from mergers in three ways: by acquiring an interest in the con-
stituent companies and selling out to the conglomerate, from commissions on the sale of 
the bonds and preferred shares, and by keeping about one-third of the new common stock 
for himself; see A. J. P. Taylor, Beaverbrook (London, 1972), p. 33. 
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making the hydro development viable, while the reduced operating costs 
would mean even larger profits upon which to float securities. By adept 
management a man could find himself in control of a vast utilities monopoly 
while others provided the funds to develop it; he need put up very little of his 
own money. 
Naturally, there were obstacles to such a financial coup. The owners of a 
street railway might resent being ousted, particularly if the company had been 
formed by local businessmen who had risked funds during the early unprofit-
able years and did not wish to see their due reward siphoned off by others. 
Secondly, there was the danger of competition: a rate war between electricity 
producers might be mutually destructive. Even more dangerous, a contest for 
control in one locality might alert civic authorities to the value of the fran-
chises under which these companies operated secure from rivalry. Not only 
might this produce demands for lower rates and better service, but even the 
suggestion that municipal ownership alone could guarantee the citizens the 
benefits of new hydroelectric technology. Thus the promoter had not only to 
eliminate competitors by treaty or by conquest, he had also to become expert 
at handling politicians. Ideally, he must convince municipal officials of the 
value of his plans and win their support, but if he failed to do so he must be 
prepared to call upon a higher level of government to override local protests. 
Halifax was one Canadian city in which a classic utilities promotion scheme 
was carried out between 1909 and 1917, almost a case study of how private 
interests could get their own way over all objections. Edmund Arthur Robert 
was a forty-five year old company promoter from Montreal, already preparing 
a takeover bid for the street railway in his home city when he first heard of 
the possibilities in the Nova Scotia capital.2 He was attracted immediately. 
For one thing his informant was Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia and 
Defence in the Laurier administration and an important Liberal in a province 
ruled continuously by that party since 1884. In any dealings with the govern-
ment of Premier George Murray, Borden would obviously be very useful, and 
he was eager to join in a syndicate aiming at an electrical monopoly in the 
Halifax region. In business Borden was, frankly, a failure, nagged by the 
knowledge that all his power and influence had not brought him wealth. How 
he yearned for the baronial life of one of those fake chateaux overlooking 
the smoky sprawl of a great Canadian city like William Mackenzie's "Ben-
venuto" in Toronto. But he lacked the promotional skill, the access to capital, 
the reputation for success of a man like Robert. Here at last, perhaps, was 
2 E. A. Robert incorporated the Montreal Tramways Company in 1911 to amalgamate the 
existing street railways. 
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Borden's chance to strike it rich, and on a visit to England he drew Robert 
aside and unfolded his proposition.3 
For some time Borden had been interested in the potential of the Gaspereau 
River near his home in Canning, N.S., some fifty-five miles northwest of 
Halifax. By 1909 he had decided to put forward a bill to charter the Nova 
Scotia Power and Pulp Company to exploit the timber resources of the Gas-
pereau valley and to develop and distribute hydroelectricity. The act of incor-
poration was to include the broadest possible powers for the company. Robert 
agreed that once the charter passed he would pay $100,000 in cash for a share 
in the undertaking; Borden's job was to use his political influence in the com-
pany's interest for which he would receive $250,000 worth of its common 
stock.4 The bill, which was shepherded through the provincial legislature by 
Liberal M.L.A. H. H. Wickwire gave Nova Scotia Power and Pulp the right 
to do "nearly everything under the sun."5 Included was the authority to enter 
any municipality for the purpose of stringing wires and erecting poles even 
without the consent of local authorities. This, of course, was the tool which 
might enable the company to crack the Halifax market despite any resistance 
from the city. The provision did not go unnoticed; both City Solicitor F. H. 
Bell and F. W. W. Doane, City Engineer and Secretary-Treasurer of the 
Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, appeared before the Private Bills Com-
mittee to protest against this violation of municipal rights. They suggested all 
disputes between local governments and utilities should be arbitrated by the 
newly-created Board of Public Utilities Commissioners. Skilful backpedalling 
saved the day for the company; the promoters claimed they were already 
negotiating with some towns in the Gaspereau valley, and that the P.U.C.'s 
interference would adversely affect them. They offered to confine the opera-
tions of the company to that area alone in return for exemption from the 
P.U.C.'s control. There was, after all, nothing to prevent them returning to 
the legislature at a later date to have this restriction lifted.6 
Once the act of incorporation was signed into law E. A. Robert, in associ-
ation with another Montreal company promoter, J. W. McConnell, carried 
out his part of the deal, paying over $100,000 in cash for the company's 
3 Borden's papers chronicle his many unsuccessful business ventures,- on his attitude towards 
successful entrepreneurs see, in particular, the correspondence with Henry Mill Pellatt. 
Borden's son-in-law, L. S. Maccoun, also tried to interest some German investors in the 
Gaspereau properties without success; see E. A. Robert to Borden, 10 February 1909 and 
reply, 11 February 1909, Sir Frederick Borden Papers, Box 171, Provincial Archives of 
Nova Scotia [hereafter PANSl. 
4 W. G. A. Lambe to Borden, 5 May 1909, Borden Papers, Box 171, PANS. 
5 Borden to Wickwire, 26 February 1909 and reply, 3 March 1909, Borden Papers, Box 171, 
PANS,- Herald (Halifax), 24 March 1911. 
6 Nova Scotia, Statutes, 1909, c. 167; Herald, 1 April 1911. 
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water rights and $250,000 in securities for the lands and timber it controlled.7 
The next task which faced the syndicate was more demanding: to secure con-
trol of the street railway in Halifax. Not only would the Halifax Electric 
Tramway Company absorb up to 5,000 horsepower of electricity from the 
Gaspereau development, but that company's 1908 earnings of $190,000, to-
gether with the $460,000 in its surplus account, would then be available to pay 
the dividends and interest upon the large amounts of new stocks and bonds 
which Robert and McConnell planned to float.8 The ideal arrangement would 
have been to persuade the shareholders of the Halifax Electric Tramway to 
exchange their securities for shares in Nova Scotia Power and Pulp. The 
difficulty was that the latter company was not permitted to own stock in 
other undertakings, nor could it exercise the tramway's franchise rights to 
use the streets of Halifax. For this reason the syndicate decided to make a 
further application to the Nova Scotia legislature in 1911. They would request 
that the restrictions on the company's right to own the shares and franchises 
of other concerns be removed, along with the confinement of its operations 
to the Gaspereau valley imposed in 1909. The name would be changed to 
the Nova Scotia Power Company (since the Montrealers had no interest in its 
lumbering operation), and the authorized capital stock increased from 
$6,000,000 to $10,000,000, providing an ample supply of securities to be used 
in a stock swap with Halifax Electric Tramway shareholders.9 
Once again, H. H. Wickwire undertook to put the private bill through the 
House with the help of lawyer W. E. Roscoe. The task was made more diffi-
cult by the rumours which soon began to circulate. The Halifax Herald, a 
strong proponent of municipal ownership, warned that the company was 
"making its way towards Halifax from the Gaspereau." There was such 
strenuous criticism of a sweeping clause to permit the company "to exercise 
the franchises and charter rights of any corporation having like powers to 
those of the company," that Wickwire was forced to withdraw it with the 
lame excuse that it had been included only through a printer's error.10 More 
serious was the Legislative Council's refusal to lift the geographical restriction 
to the Gaspereau area unless the company placed itself under the jurisdiction 
of the P.U.C. But the promoters fought back. Fred Borden proved his worth 
to the syndicate with several strongly-worded telegrams to Premier Murray 
7 W. G. A. Lambe to Borden, 30 September 1910, Borden Papers, Box 174, PANS. 
8 Robert to Borden, 23 January 1911, Borden Papers, Box 175, PANS; profit figures are given 
in Railway and Marine World (May, 1909), p. 363. 
9 Arthur Adams to Borden, 2 February 1911, Borden Papers, Box 175, PANS; Nova Scotia, 
Statutes, 1911, c. 147. 
10 W. E. Roscoe to Borden, 6 February 1911 and reply, 13 February 1911, Borden Papers, 
Box 175, PANS; Roscoe to Borden, 1 April 1911, Borden Papers, Box 176, PANS; Herald, 
24, 29 March 1911. 
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urging the rejection of the Legislative Council's amendments to the charter. 
Although the bill was a "private" one, the Liberal whips were put on and it 
passed by a vote of 20 to 5, just one Grit joining the four Tories in opposition. 
Roscoe expressed relief to Borden at being "able to pull through so well in 
the Power [Company charter] amendment. The whole thing was very dan-
gerous and I found needed most thorough and continuous attention . . . . 
Your telegram certainly was very helpful. It enabled us to get the best men for 
the final attack with a display of will and energy that we probably could not 
have secured otherwise."11 
Just when things seemed to be going forward as planned, however, Robert 
and his associates became aware of a new obstacle, a formidable group of 
rivals equally determined to establish an electrical monopoly in Halifax. 
Company promoter John R. Macleod and industrialist Frank Stanfield had 
become interested in the potential of the Mersey River near Liverpool, N.S. 
In 1910 they chartered the Nova Scotia Hydraulic Company with powers 
almost as broad as their competitors.12 Together with stockbroker F. B. 
McCurdy and lawyer-entrepreneur B. F. Pearson (who controlled the 
Halifax Morning Chronicle and the afternoon Daily Echo) they also began 
to acquire shares in the Halifax Electric Tramway Company. They considered 
the policies of the current management of the street railway sadly stick-in-
the-muddish: 
It is . . . known that the company has never made any endeavour to 
secure contracts for power, and has never pressed or endeavoured to 
increase its sale of electrical energy, either in the form of light or power, 
for the reason that the plant is now up to its capacity. It is known that 
the dilatory action of the Tramway in exploiting the sale of power has 
kept the sale very much below the demand that can be created therefor. 
The Tramway service can be enlarged as well as the lighting service. The 
lack of power of the most economical kind for the use of local industries 
is apparent.13 
Pearson, himself a member of the street railway's board since its foundation 
in 1895, was convinced that there was a market for 10,000 horsepower of 
electricity in Halifax, twice present consumption. He hoped that the other 
11 Nova Scotia, House of Assembly, Debates Ihereafter NS, Assembly, Debates], 28 March 
1911; Herald, 29 March, 1 April 1911; Borden to G. H. Murray, 26, 27, 30 March 1911, 
Borden Papers, Box 175, PANS; Borden to W. E. Roscoe, 5 April 1911 and reply, 8 April 
1911, Borden Papers, Box 176, PANS. 
12 Memorandum re merger, undated, Nova Scotia Power Company File, PANS. 
13 Draft letter from F. B. McCurdy (?) to prospective stock purchaser, undated, Nova Scotia 
Power Company File, PANS. 
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15,000 horsepower generated by the Mersey could be used to produce pulp 
and paper at Liverpool.14 
Thus by the spring of 1911 "the race for Halifax began."15 The price of 
Halifax Electric Tramway Company shares advanced as the two syndicates 
bid for them, but most stockholders, mainly local citizens, appeared content 
to hold onto their interest in the solidly profitable operation. Neither Robert 
nor the Macleod-McCurdy-Pearson group were able to secure a controlling 
interest. The unwelcome interest focussed upon street railway affairs by the 
debate in the legislature over the amendments to the Nova Scotia Power 
Company's charter helped to convince both syndicates that continued rivalry 
might imperil the planned coup. Macleod and his friends recognized that the 
power potential of the Mersey was so much greater than the demand for 
electricity in Halifax that the Gaspereau development was more suitable. 
Within a few days of the passage of the Nova Scotia Power Company's charter 
amendments a tentative agreement upon a merger had been reached.16 Yet 
relations between the two groups remained cool and suspicious, each ap-
parently fearful that the other might try and oust it. Here again Borden's 
influence proved critical; Premier Murray and federal Finance Minister W. S. 
Fielding were persuaded to call the parties together and order them to make 
a final peace. They did so, and in return for this help the syndicate agreed to 
help the minister in his campaign for re-election.17 
It was well that the peace was made, for the board of the Halifax Electric 
Tramway Company belatedly began to organize a resistance. On 12 January 
1912 Senator David MacKeen, the president, solicited proxies from all share-
holders giving him authority to fight off the takeover bid.18 At the same time 
the directors commenced negotiations with the city of Halifax for the renewal 
of the company's exclusive twenty-one year franchise to operate a street rail-
way, due to expire in 1916. By mid-February agreement had been reached 
upon another twenty-one year term. In return for the extension the company 
would continue to pay the city 4% of its gross railway revenues plus 2% of its 
lighting and gas receipts. Dividends on Tramway shares would be limited to 
8% per annum, excess profits being divided equally between city and com-
pany once a reserve of $60,000 had been set aside for renewals, replacements 
and extensions. The company undertook not to issue any further securities 
beyond the presently authorized $600,000 in bonds and $1,500,000 in common 
14 Herald, 16 December 1911. 
15 Memorandum re merger of 1911, undated, Nova Scotia Power Company File, PANS. 
16 Memorandum of agreement between John R. Macleod, Frank Stanfield, B. F. Pearson, 
F. B. McCurdy, E. A. Robert, 1 April 1911, Nova Scotia Power Company File, PANS; 
Robert to Borden, 30 May 1911, Borden Papers, Box 176, PANS. 
17 Arthur Adams to Borden, 19 August 1911, Borden Papers, Box 178, PANS. 
18 Speech of R. E. Finn, NS, Assembly, Debates, 1 May 1914. 
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stock, nor to sell or lease its properties or permit its shares to be held by any 
other utilities corporation. Any contract made for the purchase of electric 
current from an outside supplier would be subject to approval by the city.19 
These were exacting terms but mutually satisfactory: they effectively stymied 
the takeover and left the present management in control of the street railway. 
Robert, Macleod and their associates, who by now held 38% of the Tramway's 
stock, were infuriated by this arrangement. In an open letter to the share-
holders, they protested bitterly that the board had no right to enter into such 
an agreement without the approval of the stockholders. Only five of the nine 
directors, it was pointed out, had voted for the agreement, and those five men 
held just 504 of the 14,000 outstanding shares. Although profits and dividends 
were to be permanently limited, the matter had not even been discussed at 
the annual meeting in February. "The income and property of the Company 
are to be diverted and taken out of the hands of the shareholders, who are 
the real owners of the property," the letter ran, arguing that limiting dividends 
was simply "robbing them of their rightful participation in the Company's 
prosperity." Worst of all, it was noted, the City Solicitor had recently given 
his opinion that the Tramway Company already possessed a perpetual fran-
chise to use the city's streets under its 1895 charter. While this right might 
not be exclusive after 1916, the company had laid tracks on all the main 
thoroughfares, rendering competition from another street railway a practical 
impossibility. Why now, of all times, should the company make concessions 
to the city to secure an extension of its franchise?20 
When the board of directors met to consider this outpouring a deep division 
of opinion quickly became evident. F. B. McCurdy (who was the company's 
largest shareholder) naturally expressed the opposition of the takeover syndi-
cate to the new deal with the city. Two other directors, Abner Kingman and 
O. E. Smith, supported him, but they were outvoted by J. Y. Payzant, W. B. 
Ross, J. S. Mackintosh, C. C. Blackadar and M. C. Grant. They promptly 
placed an advertisement in the newspapers affirming their support for the new 
contract.21 Bested in the boardroom, the dissidents retreated to their second 
line of defence, the provincial legislature, which would have to ratify the 
19 Report of the Finance Committee, 18 January, 9 February 1912, City of Halifax, City 
Council Minutes (microfilm) thereafter Halifax Council MinutesJ, 1911-12, PANS; Morning 
Chronicle (Halifax), 9 February 1912. 
20 Morning Chronicle, 10, 14 February 1912; Mclnnes, Mellish, Fulton & Kenny, Covert 
& Pearson, Maclean, Birchell & Ralston to Shareholders of the Halifax Electric Tramway 
Company, 16 March 1912 (printed circular), Board of Public Utilities Commissioners of 
Nova Scotia [hereafter P.U.C.], File E-77z, in the P.U.C.'s office, Halifax. 
21 Morning Chronicle, 16 March 1912; only O. E. Smith actually registered his vote against 
the movement, and President MacKeen, then 73 years old, does not seem to have taken 
much part in the debate although he reportedly opposed both the takeover and the deal 
with the city. 
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arrangement. Appearing before the Railway and Municipal Committee, G. 
Fred Pearson (the son of B. F. Pearson) and his law partner, W. H. Covert, 
claimed to speak for 251 individuals owning 8800 of the 14,000 shares. Pearson 
argued that the contract between the city and the owners of the company 
could not be altered without the consent of both the parties. Covert insisted 
that he did not speak for the Nova Scotia Power syndicate, and both he and 
Pearson were careful to point out that additional legislation would be re-
quired before the Halifax Tramway could be sold to anyone else. City 
Solicitor Bell contended, however, that the shareholders of the street railway 
could scarcely complain of unfair treatment. A dividend of 8% on shares 
originally bought for $20 and now trading at $150 was generous indeed. Not 
only would the new franchise provide tax revenue for the city, but it would 
prevent the street railway becoming part of a stock speculation. Director 
J. C. Mackintosh told the committee that all the opposition to the bill was 
coming from the Nova Scotia Power interests, and speaking for the board 
T. S. Rogers, K.C., stated the matter bluntly: in 1911 the company had 
earned over $215,000 and the directors had concluded that the citizens of 
Halifax were entitled to share in those profits.22 This, of course, put the best 
possible light upon the board's action. A more accurate analysis might be 
that management was prepared to make a few concessions to the city in 
return for protection from the rapacious Montrealers determined to oust them. 
When the bill reached the floor of the House, members loyal to the syndi-
cate quickly moved the three month hoist.23 H. H. Wickwire harrumphed 
that, "They talked about this company being a public utility. How much 
more so that the Bank of Nova Scotia, and what would the bank say if we 
told them that they should not earn more than thirteen or fourteen percent 
on their investment, and that they should pay four percent for their deposits?" 
Others disagreed. R. M. MacGregor pointed out that "the whole trend of 
modern legislation [was] to recognize that public utilities were in a special 
class and subject to interference in a way that private corporations were not." 
G. E. Faulkner, Liberal member for Halifax City, noted that this distinction 
between public and private enterprises was "hardly the vapouring of dema-
gogues and anarchists," but something accepted by the leading thinkers of 
the day.24 Although the opponents of the bill failed to block it, they man-
22 Morning Chronicle, 21 March, 3 April 1912; Memorandum with Respect to the House of 
Assembly Bill No. 29, submitted to the Committee of Railways and Municipalities of the 
House of Assembly on behalf of 251 Shareholders of the Halifax Electric Tramway Company, 
holding 8800 Shares out of a total issue of 14000, Halifax, N. S., April 2nd, 1911 [sic, 1912], 
P.U.C., File E-77z. 
23 The motion called for the bill to be read three months hence, that is when the House had 
adjourned, the parliamentary form of shelving legislation. 
24 NS, Assembly, Debates, 23 April 1912. 
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aged to make significant alterations. The Tramway Company was forbidden 
to increase its dividends or capitalization and to sell shares to other utilities 
for a period of one year, but the new agreement with the city was not brought 
into force. The act simply noted that negotiations between city and company 
were continuing, and provided that any extension of the franchise would only 
come into force through proclamation of the Lieutenant Governor in Coun-
cil.25 With a majority of the shareholders in open revolt and Premier Murray 
in charge of proclaiming the legislation, it was clear that the Nova Scotia 
Power interests had effectively blocked the deal arranged by the directors. 
In a year's time, when the legislation expired, the syndicate would once again 
be in a position to merge the two companies by an exchange of securities. 
Before that year elapsed Macleod, McCurdy and Pearson had decided to 
take their profit immediately by selling out to Robert and his friends in the 
fall of 1912. The Montrealer's triumph was capped by their agreement to 
stay out of the street railway business and not attempt to bring power from 
the Mersey to Halifax for at least five years.26 Reflecting upon his experiences 
of the past couple of years, John Macleod was bitter at the hopelessly back-
ward attitude of well-to-do Haligonians of the kind who dominated the street 
railway's board: 
There are many citizens, and their opinions are entitled to every respect, 
who do not wish Halifax to become other than a quiet, comfortable place 
of residence. Naturally, they object to the introduction of hydroelectric 
power and do not want Halifax to become an industrial or manufacturing 
centre for fear it should become less desirable as a residential city. Well, 
I hold different views. I favour industry and think the place can expand 
industrially and still be sufficiently attractive as a place of residence.27 
He and his friends decided to go and seek their fortunes in other, greener 
pastures. 
On 1 November 1912 stockbroker McCurdy delivered all of the shares 
owned by his group, as well as those he held for the Robert-McConnell 
interests, to the newly-created Nova Scotia Development Company.28 This 
25 Nova Scotia, Statutes, 1912, c. 78. 
26 Speech of J. S. Tory, NS, Assembly, Debates, 6 May 1914. 
27 Speech (?) by J. R. Macleod (?), "What About the Nova Scotia Power Company?", undated 
Nova Scotia Power Company File, PANS. 
28 The complex corporate history of the syndicate ran as follows: Nova Scotia Power and 
Pulp Company, incorporated provincially in 1909, changed its name to Nova Scotia Power 
Company in 1911. Nova Scotia Development Company was incorporated by federal letters 
patent on 24 October 1912 and acquired all of Nova Scotia Power's shares in Halifax Electric 
Tramway on 1 November 1912. On 13 August 1913 Nova Scotia Development changed its 
name to Nova Scotia Light and Power Company, and in January 1917 all the assets of that 
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holding company had been incorporated in Montreal under federal letters 
patent in an effort to free the syndicate from scrutiny by over-inquisitive 
Nova Scotians; its initial assets consisted of 9,863 shares of Halifax Electric 
Tramway stock received from McCurdy, 6000 of them purchased for $170 
per share, the remaining 3,683 for $165.29 Since all of these shares had been 
acquired for less than $160 apiece, this represented a profit of more than 
$78,000 for those individuals who handed over their stock. Thereafter, Robert 
and McConnell continued to snap up all other Halifax Tramway stock which 
became available, and by the time of the street railway's annual meeting in 
February 1913, the Nova Scotia Development Company controlled 11,500 
of the 14,000 shares outstanding. At the meeting no time was lost in ousting 
all the directors who had supported the new agreement with the city, and 
Robert had himself installed as president.30 He and his associates had now 
achieved control of a concern grossing more than $600,000 annually, and pay-
ing a solid 5% on its bonds and 8% on its common stock. Since the syndicate 
held 82% of that stock, it would receive about $92,000 in dividends each 
year thereafter.31 
The takeover only seemed to increase the hostility of the citizens of 
Halifax towards E. A. Robert and his schemes. On the very day that he as-
sumed the presidency, the city council voted to ask the province for power 
to acquire the street railway. If the ratepayers approved, the company would 
be offered $170 per share for its common stock. Should the company refuse 
to sell the price would be fixed by arbitration.32 While insisting that relations 
between the city and the street railway must remain governed by the 1895 
contract, Robert responded to the threat of municipalization in two ways. 
An extensive and costly public relations campaign filled the city's news-
papers with large advertisements carrying titles such as "Government Owner-
ship Hampers Progress and Development of Public Utilities" and "Lack of 
é 
company were sold to Nova Scotia Tramways and Power Company, incorporated by the 
province in 1914. See "Name History" in the "Scrapbook History of Nova Scotia Light 
and Power Company, Limited" held by the Nova Scotia Power Corporation, which kindly 
permitted us to examine its records. 
29 Speech of J. S. Tory, NS, Assembly, Debates, 6 May 1914. 
30 Morning Chronicle, 12 February 1913. 
31 Canadian Railway and Marine World (May, 1914), p. 235. It seems likely that the syndicate 
borrowed most of the money required to purchase its shares in Halifax Electric Tramway; if 
so, the dividends they received would have provided the sums needed to pay the interest 
on these loans, so that they acquired control of the Tramway without having to put up any 
of their own money. 
32 Halifax Council Minutes, 1912-13, 11 February 1913, PANS; council had already demon-
strated its hostility to the merger of the two syndicates in November 1912 by passing a 
resolution opposing the sale of the street railway to any other utility and calling for a plebis-
cite on municipalizing the company; see ibid., 11 November 1912. 
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Economy in Public Ownership."33 As a further obstacle to the city's plan 
Robert's lawyers informed Mayor F. P. Bligh of the intention to apply to the 
provincial legislature to incorporate a new company, Halifax Tramways and 
Power Company. Capitalized at $5,000,000, this concern would have the right 
to take control of Halifax Electric Tramway and to develop 12,000 horse-
power of hydroelectricity on the Gaspereau River.34 
Once again the Railway and Municipal Committee of the Assembly found 
itself the forum for a heated debate on the future of the Halifax street railway. 
Although the chairman, R. M. MacGregor, suggested that the two parties 
try and reach a compromise, many aldermen now felt committed to public 
ownership and four hours of bitter wrangling ensued before the council 
would even consent to negotiate.35 Robert offered an increase in the com-
pany's annual payment to the city from 4% to 5% of gross tram receipts (or 
about $13,000) in return for a forty-year extension of the exclusive franchise. 
Lighting rates, he promised, would be cut by one-third and power rates by 
one-half just as soon as hydroelectricity was developed by the company and 
transmitted to Halifax, an annual saving of about $40,000 for electricity 
users.36 Such an offer could be made without placing an undue strain on 
the company's finances since revenues were rising at the rate of 10% per 
year; lighting rates were currently l i e per kilowatt hour, so high that only 
one-quarter of the city's homes had electric light, while power cost 7c 
per kilowatt hour. The promoters of a competing hydroelectric develop-
ment believed they could make a solid profit charging rates of 7.5c per 
kilowatt hour for lighting and 1.5c per kilowatt hour for power, so that 
the reductions offered by Robert did not endanger the earnings of the 
Halifax Electric Tramway.37 From the city's point of view the deal was less 
appealing; not only did it entail a forty-year extension of the franchise due to 
expire in 1916, but it conceded to the street railway the right to develop 
hydroelectricity itself. This, in turn, would entail a large increase in its 
capitalization and a flood of securities to be handed out to insiders in the 
syndicate at knockdown prices. Halifax electricity users and tram riders 
33 E. A. Robert to Mayor and Aldermen of Halifax, 11 February 1913, Halifax Council Minutes, 
1912-13, 11 February 1913, PANS; advertisements ran in the Morning Chronicle on 6, 7, 8, 
12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31 March, 1, 2 April 1913. 
34 Covert and Pearson to Mayor F. P. Bligh, 12 March 1913, Halifax Council Minutes, 1912-13, 
13 March 1913, PANS; Morning Chronicle, 14 March 1913. 
35 Morning Chronicle, 27 March 1913. 
36 E. A. Robert to Mayor F. P. Bligh, 1 April 1913, Halifax Council Minutes, 1912-13, 1 April 
1913, PANS. 
37 These estimates were made by engineers investigating the feasibility of a hydroelectric 
development at the Head of St. Margaret's Bay, just west of the city, planned by the Halifax 
Development Company; see R. McColl to J. H. Dunn, 14 February 1913, Sir James Dunn 
Papers, volume 42, Public Archives of Canada. 
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would be required to pay the interest and dividends on these gilt-edged gifts. 
As a result city politicians refused to have anything to do with Robert's 
proposal despite a stepped-up advertising campaign by the company.38 
By this time the local press had entered the fray with enthusiasm. The 
Morning Chronicle and the Daily Echo, twin Liberal papers controlled by the 
Pearson family, took the side of the company. Their columns were filled 
with dismal tales of the failures of public ownership and dark charges that 
all the criticisms of the Tramway company were just Tory propaganda. In a 
series of interviews with the Daily Echo, later reissued as a pamphlet, local 
business leaders sang the praises of E. A. Robert; typical was former alderman 
Nelson B. Smith, who argued that "capitalists will not invest here if there is 
any uncertainty of their franchise, or any danger of being deprived of their 
profits. Capital is sensitive and avoids risky places." Much space was given 
to the Tramway president's own views; he complained that "Other ambitious 
cities subscribe money and send out industrial agents to advertize them and 
extend a welcome to prospective investors. Halifax seems to have one very 
active and aggressive agency engaged in the work of driving away capital and 
discouraging the investment of money in the institutions of the city."39 The 
Conservative Herald and its sister, the Evening Mail, controlled by Senator 
William Dennis, were not a whit dismayed by such criticisms. They fulmin-
ated violently against the carpet-baggers from Montreal who now controlled 
the street railway. At every opportunity the triumphant successes of public 
ownership were recounted and the city politicians encouraged to keep up 
the good fight. 
Failure to reach a compromise between city and company meant that the 
hearings before the Railway and Municipal Committee were bound to be 
stormy. Testifying on the city's request to take over the street railway, Robert 
set the tone by charging that Senator Dennis supported public ownership only 
because of a secret deal with a Montreal real estate developer named D. 
Lome McGibbon; the two hoped to have the city extend the street railway 
through a tract of land they were holding for speculative purposes.40 The 
company's lawyer made the predictable references to the sacredness and 
inviolability of the terms of the 1895 agreement. City Solicitor Bell and a 
representative of the Trades and Labour Council replied with a description 
of the virtues of municipalization.41 A second hearing produced no more than 
38 Council rejected Robert's proposal by 8 to 5; see Halifax Council Minutes, 1912-13, 1 April 
1913, PANS; advertisements praising the offer or the syndicate's charter legislation ran in 
the Morning Chronicle on 2, 3, 5, 10, 14, 24 April 1913. 
39 Some Tram and Power Considerations (n.p., n.d. 119131 ) may be found in File E-77z, P.U.C. 
40 McGibbon had joined with Robert to incorporate Montreal Tramways in 1911, but it was 
alleged that they had fallen out subsequently. 
41 Morning Chronicle, 5 April 1913. 
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a repetition of familiar arguments by both sides.42 Unable to act without 
provoking a violent outcry by one party or the other, the politicians responded 
in classic fashion, by stalling. The committee recommended that both the 
city and the company bills should be killed. On the floor of the Assembly, 
city member G. E. Faulkner denounced the city council for seeking the alter-
ation of its contractual obligations: "Many Canadians, including citizens of 
Halifax, had invested their money in Mexico, in Sao Paulo, in Rio de Janeiro, 
based on concessions granted by municipalities and governments. If those 
concessions were to be repudiated would it be tolerated for a moment? He 
believed that in such a case there would be armed intervention." With the 
spectre of gunboats in the Bedford Basin dancing before their eyes, the legis-
lators swiftly approved the shelving of both bills.43 
Neither side was prepared to allow matters to rest there. The syndicate 
quickly introduced a bill to increase the capitalization of the Halifax Electric 
Tramway Company to permit it to develop Gaspereau power, thus achieving 
the same end by different means.44 Equally promptly a mass meeting of citi-
zens on the Grand Parade condemned this as "a breach of legislative contract, 
an imposition of unsought and undesirable burdens and a linking of the 
interests of the city with an enterprise operating beyond the city's confines 
with which the city ought not to be forced to become concerned."45 The two 
Liberal M.L.A.s from Halifax, G. E. Faulkner and R. E. Finn, attacked the 
bill, arguing that such a scheme had already been voted down once that 
session. Premier Murray, however, leapt to the defence of E. A. Robert, 
telling the House that "There had been too much pessimism, too much of the 
feeling that the capitalist wherever he came from, who approached the legis-
lature with the desire to invest capital in these great [water] powers was a 
dangerous person . . . ." The Montrealer, he said, ought not be vilified for his 
willingness to become involved in the development of the province of Nova 
Scotia. Despite this the Liberal leader reminded members that the bill was a 
private one on which they were free to vote as their consciences dictated, 
and he admitted, somewhat shamefacedly, that in view of the outcry raised 
by the citizens of Halifax he intended to cast his vote against it. With the 
Liberals freed from the whips the charter amendments were shelved by a vote 
of 17 to 12. At the same time the House also rejected a renewed request from 
the city for power to expropriate the street railway, the Liberals lining up 
42 Ibid., 8 April 1913. 
43 NS, Assembly, Debates, 22 April 1913. 
44 Ibid., 7 May 1913. 
45 Halifax City Clerk to Premier G. H. Murray, 8 May 1913, City of Halifax Papers, City 
Clerk's Department, PANS. 
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unanimously against it.46 Undaunted by its reverses the company introduced a 
third bill that session to increase the authorized capitalization of the Halifax 
Electric Tramway from $1,500,000 to $2,000,000. Charles Tanner, the Oppo-
sition Leader, angrily attacked this piece of corporate effrontery, warning 
that his party would not consider such rights bona fide and would repeal 
them if it came to power. Murray's Liberals, however, apparently felt that 
they owed Robert (and his ally, Fred Borden) some sort of consolation prize 
and permitted the bill to pass.47 
Nonetheless, by mid-1913 Robert had failed to carry out his plans. The 
major obstacle had proved to be the provincial Conservative party, which 
had made the objections of Halifax civic leaders its own. The Halifax Plat-
form of 1907 had endorsed public ownership of utilities, and Robert Borden 
had warned at that time against the "vast accumulation of wealth in the hands 
of a few men, [which] confronts us with the possibility that great national 
resources may pass into the hands of an oligarchy of wealth and may be used 
for the oppression rather than the benefit of the people."48 The political 
success of Sir James Whitney's Hydro-Electric Power Commission in Ontario 
had not gone unnoticed, and Opposition Leader Charles Tanner had led the 
fight for public power in Nova Scotia, criticizing private utilities monopolies 
at every opportunity. Premier Murray, however, rejected public ownership. 
As he told the Assembly, "To take care of the public interest would be a 
sound policy, but this was very different from going to the treasury and 
making investments in water powers . . . . Personally, he would be glad to see 
private companies come in and develop water powers if the legislature took 
care that their rights were not exercised in such a way as to be inimical to the 
public interests."49 But the popular outcry against Robert's schemes, against 
the very lack of protection afforded the public interest, was so intense that 
Murray could hardly be expected to take all the political blame for putting 
through the charter changes, particularly in view of the fact that the two 
Liberals from Halifax, G. E. Faulkner and R. E. Finn, would have to vote 
against them or risk losing their seats. 
E. A. Robert's experience in Montreal had made him an expert, however, 
in the handling of politicians, an essential skill for a utilities promoter. If 
some of the local Conservatives could be won over to his side, some of the 
46 NS, Assembly, Debates, 7, 8 May 1913; the city council passed a unanimous resolution 
critical of the refusal to permit a plebiscite on expropriation; see Halifax Council Minutes, 
1913-14, 12 May 1913, PANS. 
47 NS, Assembly, Debates, 13 May 1913; NS, Statutes, 1913, c. 194. 
48 The Liberal-Conservative Platform as Laid Down by R. L. Borden, M. P. Opposition Leader, 
at Halifax, August 28th, 1907 (n.p., n.d.). 
49 NS, Assembly, Debates, 3 March 1914; Murray was speaking in the debate on the incorpor-
ation of the Canadian Provincial Power Company. 
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steam might be taken out of the party's attacks upon him. He soon discovered 
that two influential Tories, Edgar N. Rhodes, M.P. for Cumberland, and his 
uncle, Senator Nathaniel Curry, owned a potential hydro site on the West 
River at Sheet Harbour, N.S. With little difficulty Robert convinced them (as 
he had convinced Macleod and McCurdy before them) that they should enter 
his syndicate. For their Sheet Harbour property they would receive $100,000 
in cash, $75,000 worth of first mortgage bonds, $75,000 in preferred stock and 
$250,000 in common stock in his Montreal-based holding company.50 This 
concern, originally incorporated as the Nova Scotia Development Company, 
had changed its name to the Nova Scotia Light and Power Company in the 
summer of 1913.51 The deal made, Rhodes and Curry promptly summoned 
a couple of Tory M.L.A.s to Ottawa and let it be known that they wanted the 
party to drop its opposition to Robert's plans. Rhodes even journeyed back to 
Halifax to appear before the caucus and left believing that there would be a 
free vote on the matter.52 Meanwhile, Senator Curry had been doing his best 
to persuade fellow-Senator William Dennis to moderate the opposition of his 
newspapers, the Herald and the Evening Mail. "Unless the people of Halifax 
change their attitude towards corporations that are willing to build up the 
city," wrote Curry to Dennis, "it will mean that Halifax will lie dead until the 
present generation of kickers die off and a new and more progressive genera-
tion comes to the front."53 
Thus, when the 1914 session of the provincial legislature opened all seemed 
in readiness. A new charter application had been prepared in the name of the 
Nova Scotia Tramways and Power Company. Capitalized at $20,000,000, this 
company proposed to issue $3,000,000 in bonds, $3,250,000 in preferred stock 
and $6,000,000 in common shares to acquire the street railway and the proper-
ties at the Gaspereau and Sheet Harbour. Since the properties had cost the 
Robert syndicate only $200,000 in cash, and the 14,000 shares of Halifax 
Electric Tramway stock were worth $2,380,000 at $170 apiece plus the 
$600,000 needed to retire that company's bonds, $12,250,000 worth of securi-
ties was generous indeed. 
Some estimate of the speculative profits which Robert and his friends 
hoped to gain from this transaction can be made through a comparison with 
a rival scheme to develop and supply hydroelectricity for Halifax undertaken 
50 Senator N. Curry to Senator J. E. Dennis, 9 February 1914; H. A. Lovett to E. N. Rhodes, 
10 February 1914, E. N. Rhodes Papers, Box 410, PANS; Lovett was a Montrealer associated 
with the syndicate. 
51 See n. 28 above. 
52 Rhodes to W. G. Foster, 20 April 1914; Rhodes to John C. Douglas, 25 April 1914, Rhodes 
Papers, Box 410, PANS. 
53 Curry to Senator William Dennis, 4 April 1914, Rhodes Papers, Box 410, PANS. 
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at the same time. The Halifax Development Company, organized by S. M. 
Brookfield, the president of the Maritime Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany, owned the rights to the water powers on the Northeast and Indian 
Rivers at the Head of St. Margaret's Bay, just 17 miles west of the city. A 
study undertaken by the well-known electrical engineering firm of C. H. and 
P. H. Mitchell of Toronto concluded that the Halifax Development Company 
could generate 6000 horsepower annually for an investment of $520,000. The 
company decided to develop 4000 horsepower initially, or about the amount 
produced by Halifax Electric Tramway's thermal station, and the Mitchells 
advised that a distribution system for both power and lighting, covering not 
only Halifax but Dartmouth (where the Tram company did not operate) 
could be constructed for $97,800. Charging rates for electricity averaging less 
than half those presently demanded by Halifax Electric Tramway, the Halifax 
Development Company expected to earn a solid 6% on its $600,000 worth of 
bonds, 8% on its $1,000,000 worth of common stock and still pile up a surplus 
of $29,300 during the first year of operation.54 Even though Robert's Gas-
pereau properties were decidedly inferior to the waterpowers at the Head of 
St. Margaret's Bay, both in terms of cost of development and reliability of 
stream flow, he had several evident advantages. Not only did control of Hali-
fax Electric Tramway ensure a demand for a large, steady base load and the 
right to use the existing distribution system, but this made available the 
street railway's earnings, $270,000 in 1913, plus the $794,921.64 in its surplus 
account to pay the interest and dividends on the stocks and bonds to be given 
away to syndicate insiders at bargain prices.55 Moreover, the size of these 
speculative profits would be neatly concealed since Nova Scotia Tramways 
and Power would formally purchase the assets of the holding company, Nova 
Scotia Light and Power of Montreal; the value of the latter's assets could be 
enormously inflated for takeover purposes, thus justifying the flotation of so 
many securities.56 
Suddenly, however, things began to go wrong. Rumours started to circulate 
among local Conservatives that Prime Minister Robert Borden had expressed 
his opposition to the charter. It was said that if the bill went through a large 
sum would be paid into the Liberal campaign fund.57 When it became known 
that Rhodes and Curry were connected with the Nova Scotia Tramways and 
Power application their friends reacted with dismay; one warned Rhodes that 
54 See above n. 37; the engineers' report is attached to R. McColl to J. H. Dunn, 14 February 
1913, Sir James Dunn Papers, volume 42, Public Archives of Canada. 
55 Canadian Railway and Marine World (May, 1914), p. 235. 
56 See n. 28 above; since Nova Scotia Light and Power had a federal charter the size of the 
syndicate's investment could be concealed from Nova Scotians. 
57 Rhodes to John C. Douglas, 25 April 1914; Rhodes to C. E. Tanner, 28 March 19.14, Rhodes 
Papers, Box 410, PANS. 
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This whole private company ownership of public utilities, such as trans-
portation and light in cities, is [a] d d dangerous franchise to own 
. . . . What I am afraid of is that you people do not know what a keen 
bunch you are apparently running with — Robert and Sir Fred [Borden] 
have no love for you and your uncle, and there are financiers in Halifax 
not to be tampered with, whose interests extend to near towns. But if 
you imagine you can with safety monkey with that N. S. Power bunch 
you want to go easy. I wouldn't trust one of the bunch on either side if 
$500 was at stake.58 
Reuben P. Proctor, president of the Halifax County Liberal-Conservative 
Association, despatched a confidential telegram to every member of the Tory 
caucus denouncing the bill. The promoters, he charged, were "prepared to 
slash [the] Public Utilities Act so that their stocks and bonds may be issued 
without regard to semblance of physical value." He urged his fellow-Tories 
to back up the protests of municipal spokesmen in the legislature.59 W. G. 
Foster, Secretary of the Association, wrote to Rhodes himself and told him 
bluntly that he thought the proposed charter objectionable, unfair and unjust, 
adding that "the party that quickly rises to the protection of municipal rights 
and will not tolerate the interference of promoters in bartering public fran-
chises is the one the people want."60 In the House of Assembly, Opposition 
Leader Tanner called for public control of all water powers in the province.61 
Rhodes did his best to prevent the party from coming out against the bill. He 
convinced himself that the attacks had been planned by F. B. McCurdy, now 
federal Conservative Member of Parliament for Queen's-Shelburne, whom he 
believed to be organizing a rival power syndicate. Where else could such op-
position to Nova Scotia Tramways and Power originate? Why would such 
"villanous, vituperous [sic], scurrilous, snake-in-the-grass" tactics be used? 
There was no truth, Rhodes insisted, to the suggestion that the Liberals 
would get a payoff once the bill passed, and dragging in party politics would 
only harm the Conservatives.62 
There is no evidence that McCurdy really was behind the clamour against 
the charter. More likely, the Conservative leadership, which had strongly 
opposed Robert's plans in 1913, concluded that the demands of both consis-
58 C. R. Bill to Rhodes, 27 March 1914, Confidential, Rhodes Papers, Box 410, PANS. 
59 The telegram was read to the Assembly by Liberal R. M. MacGregor; see NS, Assembly, 
Debates, 17 April 1914. 
60 Foster to Rhodes, 13 April 1914, Confidential, Rhodes Papers, Box 410, PANS. 
61 NS, Assembly, Debates, 3 March 1914 concerning the incorporation of the Canadian 
Provincial Power Company. 
62 Rhodes to W. G. Foster, 20, 27 April 1914, Rhodes Papers, Box 410, PANS; Rhodes' sus-
picions were increased by the fact that McCurdy's ally, J. R. Macleod, was president of the 
Halifax City Liberal-Conservative Association, which also opposed the charter bill. 
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tency and political advantage prevented any change in their position. Cer-
tainly, the rising tide of protest in the city of Halifax suggested that the 
citizens had not changed their minds. An emergency meeting of city council 
on 31 March 1914 attracted a large crowd; both councillors and members of 
the public outspokenly criticized the Nova Scotia Tramways bill. Council 
then passed a unanimous resolution condemning the "gross and flagrant viola-
tion of the rights of the city," and the "obnoxious" and "disastrous" character 
of legislation which "would not only forever prevent all possibility of the city 
ever securing control of its own franchises, but would also shut out all possi-
bility of compelling the Company operating those franchises to give the citi-
zens better service or cheaper rates."63 Large newspaper advertisements 
showed Mayor F. P. Bligh pointing an Uncle-Sam-like finger and warning, 
"YOU, MR. CITIZEN, MUST PROTECT YOUR RIGHTS." Otherwise the 
bill would "barter the people's franchises" to the "Big Interests" who would 
raise transit fares and electricity rates in order to pay themselves "bloated 
dividends."64 Printed broadsheets appeared with screaming headlines like 
"APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE: Mayor Bligh on behalf of the City of Halifax 
and its Citizens Appeals to Fellow Nova Scotians for Support and Coopera-
tion in the Fight to Protect Civic Rights and Municipal Autonomy. ^5 
Yet the syndicate did not waver in its determination to ram the legislation 
through the provincial assembly. Although the Conservative party seemed 
divided, Premier Murray and his followers, with the exception of the two city 
members, remained ready to stand up and be counted. H. H. Wickwire, pro-
moter of the bill and chairman of the Private and Local Bills Committee was 
ready to do his best to limit public hearings on the bill, particularly evening 
sessions at which the opposition to the syndicate had been able to air its 
views before large and enthusiastic crowds in 1913. But the pressure proved 
too great. No less than three hearings were held, one an evening session in the 
Assembly chamber which brought out the band of the Royal Canadian Regi-
ment to serenade the waiting crowd. Before a packed hall Mayor Bligh de-
nounced the bill at length as did A. R. Mosher of the Trades and Labor Coun-
cil and the Reverend Dr. Forrest, former president of Dalhousie, who de-
clared that the extraordinary powers requested would do no more than link 
Halifax to 150,000 acres of "blueberry barrens."66 Critics harped upon the 
63 Halifax Council Minutes, 1913-14, 31 March 1914, PANS. 
64 Acadian Recorder (Halifax), 6 April 1914. 
65 The broadsheet was enclosed in W. G. Foster to E. N. Rhodes, 13 April 1914, Confidential, 
Rhodes Papers, Box 410, PANS, along with Rejoinder to Mr. Lovett's Letter to Halifax 
Citizens. All that Halifax Asks is that the Existing Charter which Governs the Relations 
between Itself and the Tram Company Be Maintained. —F. H. Bell, K. C, Puts the Case of 
the City Strongly before the Public; Lovett's open letter appeared in the Morning Chronicle, 
8 April 1914. 
66 Morning Chronicle, 8 April 1914. 
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clause exempting the Nova Scotia Tramways and Power Company from the 
jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission, an exemption which would 
free the company from any limits upon the amount of watered stock it wished 
to issue. A local Citizen's Committee was formed and convened a series of 
mass meetings throughout Halifax.67 The city council unanimously passed 
another resolution alleging that the street railway charged exorbitant rates 
for electricity and requesting the P.U.C. to investigate, while noting that the 
huge load of debt to be piled up by the merger would make any future reduc-
tions impossible. So intense did the outcry become that eventually the Tories 
on the Private Bills Committee joined with the two Halifax Liberals to have 
this section deleted.68 
Just as it seemed that the uproar might force the shelving of the bill once 
more, or at least compel the removal of the more offensive provisions, atten-
tion was deflected away from the legislation itself for almost a fortnight. The 
ill-feeling which had mounted on both sides suddenly burst forth in a distract-
ing incident of glorious foolishness. 
It all began on the afternoon of April 16 when the Evening Mail published 
a letter, signed with pseudonym "Ian McLean," which declared; "If this bill 
passes in the face of public opinion so clearly shown and knowing the strong 
financial interests behind the bill, what conclusion will the general public 
come to? Simply that some of the gentlemen sent to the House of Assembly 
to protect our interests were unable to resist temptation and were bought, 
body and breeches."69 Not particularly outrageous by the journalistic stand-
ards of the time, the letter was seized upon by the beleaguered supporters of 
the Robert syndicate as a pretext to revenge themselves upon their most 
strident critics. As soon as the House met the next day, J. S( Tory, Liberal 
member for Guysboro, rose to demand an investigation on the grounds that 
the collective integrity of the members had been impugned. The Premier 
leapt in to agree that the letter must be the work of a "conspiracy" interested 
in a rival waterpower and attempting to block passage of the bill by deliberate 
misrepresentation. A seven man committee, chaired by Liberal J. L. Ralston, 
was hastily set up to investigate the source of funds behind the campaign 
the Herald and the Evening Mail had been conducting. This feckless under-
taking even attracted some Conservative support, and three Tories were 
named to the committee. A flood of speaker's warrants was promptly issued 
commanding the employees of the offending newspaper to appear and 
testify.70 
67 Acadian Recorder, 15 April 1914; Morning Chronicle, 17 April 1914. 
68 Halifax Council Minutes, 1913-14, 9 April 1914, PANS; H. A. Lovett to Rhodes, 23 April 
1914, Rhodes Papers, Box 410, PANS. 
69 Evening Mail (Halifax), 16 April 1914. 
70 NS, Assembly, Debates, 17 April 1914; Douglas led the Conservative support for the enquiry, 
not surprisingly since he was Rhodes' leading ally in the caucus. 
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Senator Dennis immediately ordered the republication of the passage com-
plained of, stating that he, not his subordinates, would take the blame for it. 
One of the Conservative members of the committee, R. H. Butts of Cape 
Breton, thereupon declared that the Senator had played "the part of a 
coward," since he could not be arrested so long as the Senate was sitting.71 
The Evening Mail riposted with a string of insults about Butts, including the 
dreadful charge that he wore his hat on the back of his head while the House 
of Assembly was in session. The enraged Cape Bretoner responded forcefully 
and directly; approaching the Senator at the next session of the committee 
he reached out and tweaked his nose long and hard until wrestled away by 
main force.72 The Liberal press could hardly contain itself at the sight of 
two Conservatives assaulting one another. The Morning Chronicle blossomed 
forth with learned disquisitions on whether the "tweak" was a challenge to a 
duel or reserved for those so socially inferior as to be exempt from challenge. 
One lighthearted front page story was headlined, "Has Raised a Grave Con-
stitutional Issue: Tweaking of the Senatorial Nose May Precipitate a Contest 
between Federal and Local Parliaments Necessitating Amendment of B.N.A. 
Act," a discussion of whether Butts could be hailed before the Red Chamber 
for his attack upon Dennis.73 During this knockabout farce, Ralston's 
committee tried doggedly to proceed with its investigation, despite a sign on 
the door affixed by some local wit which read "The Tweakery." William R. 
McCurdy, editor of the Herald, readily admitted that he had approved the 
"Ian McLean" letter for publication, but steadfastly refused to identify its 
author. Balked, the committee could only recommend that he be called to the 
bar of the House. The editor appeared twice to repeat his refusal, and after 
an enormous procedural wrangle it was decided to sentence him to forty-eight 
hours in jail for contempt of parliament.74 Even this proved laughable; 
McCurdy spent his time receiving visitors and grinding out stories of his 
jailhouse experiences, while crowds of admirers gathered outside in Spring 
Garden Road and the band of the Royal Canadian Regiment serenaded him 
with a programme of popular songs.75 After his release Ralston's committee 
continued its ineffectual efforts to uncover the identity of "Ian McLean." 
Finally on May 10, one J. McL. Fraser, an employee of the federal Marine 
and Fisheries Department, admitted responsibility. The investigation fizzled 
out without uncovering any evidence of a "conspiracy" against the Robert 
71 Morning Chronicle, 23 April 1914. 
72 Ibid., 24 April 1914. 
73 Ibid., 25 April 1914. 
74 NS, Assembly, Debates, 28, 29, 30 April 1914. 
75 Morning Chronicle, 4 May 1914; Sam Hughes subsequently had to answer questions in the 
House of Commons about the propriety of regimental bands participating in political demon-
strations; see the Morning Chronicle, 7 May 1914. 
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syndicate, and the Herald and the Evening Mail continued their fulminations 
against the Liberals and the supporters of the Nova Scotia Tramways bill, 
whom they promptly labelled the "tweakers."76 
Meanwhile, the charter legislation had finally emerged from the Private 
Bills Committee. Rhodes had been working hard to prevent any further de-
fections. In Ottawa he met with Prime Minister Borden to ascertain that the 
rumour he opposed the syndicate's plans was unfounded; John Douglas, 
Rhodes' closest ally in the local caucus, was hastily instructed to spread 
this news amongst the members.77 Douglas did his work well, and at the cru-
cial moment a number of Tories absented themselves and the Liberals were 
able to outvote those who remained even though they were joined by the two 
Liberals from the city, Finn and Faulkner.78 Rhodes now could report con-
fidently that his Grit friends in Ottawa were assuring him that Murray was 
prepared to put the bill through over all objections.79 Nevertheless, the 
debate in the House dragged on for half a dozen days. R. E. Finn led off for 
the opposition with a six-hour speech in which he reviewed the entire history 
of the "grab" for Halifax. Not only the city council and the Citizen's Com-
mittee were dead set against it, he declared, but so were the Board of Trade, 
the Manufacturers' Association of Nova Scotia and at least eighty percent 
of the local citizenry.80 Conservative W. L. Hall of Queen's pointed out that 
It was all right to talk about merging piano companies and underwear 
companies, because there were lots of otlier ways men could buy suits 
of underwear or pianos without buying from a merger, but from the very 
nature of public utilities they were the necessities of life. If we were 
giving them the right to monopolize the heat and light of the city the 
public must be considered. These franchises were often valuable simply 
because they had to be used . . . . Therefore, the citizen had a special 
right to be protected . . . .81 
Opposition Leader Tanner was blunter still, calling it "a criminal thing . . . 
to permit a public utility like the Halifax Tram Company to be loaded down 
with watered stock." The promoters, he said, "knew how to dodge a bill 
through the legislature if any men knew how. They had done it in Quebec 
and thought they could do it down here."82 
76 Morning Chronicle, 12 May 1914. 
77 Senator N. Curry to H. A. Lovett, 25 April 1914; Rhodes to John C. Douglas, 14 April 1914, 
Rhodes Papers, Box 410, PANS. 
78 Lovett to Rhodes, 23 April 1914, Rhodes Papers, Box 410, PANS. 
79 Rhodes to Douglas, 14 April 1914, Rhodes Papers, Box 410, PANS. 
80 NS, Assembly, Debates, 1 May 1914. 
81 Ibid., 7 May 1914. 
82 Ibid., 8 May 1914. 
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So vehement was this opposition that one member of the syndicate, H. A. 
Lovett of Montreal, who had journeyed to Halifax to watch over the progress 
of the bill, became most pessimistic. Rhodes, far off in Ottawa, remained 
confident that the Liberals would not let them down.83 And he proved right. 
E. H. Armstrong, the Commissioner of Works and Mines, insisted that the 
merger posed no bar to future public ownership.84 J. S. Tory admitted that 
there might be a little water in the $6,000,000 worth of common stock to be 
issued, but argued that nobody had ever raised such objections to corporate 
charters before.85 Premier Murray wound up the debate with a ringing attack 
upon public ownership, claiming that the charter represented the most 
efficient and economical method of securing hydroelectricity for Halifax. 
Then all the Grits, save Finn and Faulkner, trooped into the lobbies to pass 
the bill by 20 to 14. The Conservatives, Douglas included, were thus able to 
unite in opposition to the legislation, with only Butts and Frank Stanfield 
absent.86 To one Tory member who tried to explain that he had acted solely 
because of strong pressure from his constituents, Rhodes replied tartly: 
"If we had spent one-half the money which has been spent by the city of 
Halifax and the McCurdy interest in preventing passage of the bill, we could 
have created quite as much sentiment in favour of it."87 But an effort by the 
Legislative Council to make the acquisition of the Halifax Electric Tramway 
subject to a vote of the ratepayers was beaten back in the House of Assembly 
by a decisive majority and the bill became law.88 The city council refused to 
give up; on May 13 it passed a resolution declaring the charter a "legislative 
breach of faith," and on June 11 called unanimously for its disallowance on 
the grounds it had been passed "solely for the purpose of speculation." 
"Franchises," this resolution ran, "are in a very real sense the property of the 
citizens and should not be alienated not only without their assent but against 
the protest of the City Council and the representatives of the City in the 
Legislature." Justice Minister C. J. Doherty refused, however, to become em-
broiled in this local quarrel and rejected the petition for disallowance in the 
following November.89 The syndicate, meanwhile, lost no time in carrying 
83 Lovett to Rhodes, 23 April 1914 and reply, 25 April 1914, Rhodes Papers, Box 410, PANS; 
Rhodes insisted that Douglas' political judgment could be relied upon and that there was 
nothing to worry about. 
84 NS, Assembly, Debates, 4 May 1914. 
85 Ibid., 6 May 1914; Tory was a Nova Scotian who became a Sun Life executive in Montreal, 
but continued to summer in Guysboro and sit in the Assembly for his native town. He was 
very sympathetic to Robert's plans. 
86 NS, Assembly, Debates, 8 May 1914. 
87 Rhodes to Albert Parsons, 6 May 1914, Rhodes Papers, Box 410, PANS. 
88 Nova Scotia, Legislative Council, Debates, 20 May 1914; Nova Scotia, Statutes, 1914, c. 180. 
89 Halifax Council Minutes, 1914-15, 13 May, 11 June, 6 July, 5 November 1914, PANS. 
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out its plans; on 10 June 1914 E. A. Robert, Sir Frederick Borden, J. W. 
McConnell, E. N. Rhodes, Nathaniel Curry and ten others were formally 
incorporated as the Nova Scotia Tramways and Power Company.90 
The necessary organizational work occupied a full year, and it was not 
until 9 June 1915 that the first meeting of the provisional directors of Nova 
Scotia Tramways was convened. They immediately approved the issuing of 
$12,250,000 worth of securities, the proceeds from the sales to be used to 
acquire Halifax Electric Tramway and the Gaspereau properties from Nova 
Scotia Light and Power, Robert's Montreal-based holding company.91 Since 
this issue required the authorization of the Public Utilities Commission, the 
city was given one final chance to register its disapproval. How, it asked, 
could the Commission value the assets of Nova Scotia Tramways when it 
refused to reveal how much had been paid for them? Why should the risk of 
developing the power fall not upon the investors but upon the tram-riders 
and electricity-users of Halifax?92 But the P.U.C. proved a weak reed. After 
deliberating for over a year the Commissioners announced on 19 September 
1916 that they considered the merger "entirely proper": "Keeping in mind, 
then the importance to the applicant [Nova Scotia Tramways and Power], 
should the scheme be carried out, of at once having a revenue commensurate 
with the outlay, it cannot but be considered wise and prudent, if not wholly 
essential to its success, that the formidable competition of the Halifax Elec-
tric Tramway Co. Ltd. be removed, its established business and revenue at 
once procured, and a long, unprofitable period of idle capital guarded 
against." The P.U.C. valued the street railway's stock at $2,850,000 ($203.57 
per share), and this sum, taken together with the $600,000 needed to retire its 
bonds, $300,000 to acquire the Gaspereau property and $1,500,000 needed to 
develop it, plus $300,000 in working capital brought the company's cash re-
quirements to $5,550,000 in all. In order to raise this sum Nova Scotia Tram-
ways was authorized to issue $3,000,000 in bonds at $90 ($2,700,000), 
$2,500,000 in 6% cumulative preference shares at $75 ($1,875,000) and 
$2,500,000 of common stock at $40 ($1,000,000), a total of $5,575,000.93 
90 The other incorporators were William G. Ross, F. Howard Wilson, J. M. Wilson, H. A. 
Lovett, all Montrealers, P. J. Mcintosh of New York, and Obed E. Smith, W. M. P. Webster, 
Howard H. Smith, John E. Wood and J. A. Neville, all of Halifax. 
91 Minutes of the meeting of provisional directors, 9 June 1915, Nova Scotia Tramways and 
Power Company Minute Book 1, Nova Scotia Power Corporation. 
92 Brief of the City of Halifax to the Nova Scotia Board of Public Utilities, submitted by 
F. H. Bell, City Solicitor, 1915, P.U.C, File E-77z; the city also retained engineer Henry E. 
Holgate to appear before the P.U.C. as an expert witness; see Halifax Council Minutes, 1915-
16, 6 July, 5 August 1915, PANS. 
93 Report of the Public Utilities Board, [l9 September 19161, Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, 
Journals, 1917, Part II, Appendix 27, pp. 13, 36. 
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Although less than the promoters had hoped for (which was why they had 
fought so hard for exemption from the P.U.C.'s jurisdiction), this still repre-
sented a very handsome venture profit for them. At the first formal board 
meeting of Nova Scotia Tramways and Power in January, 1917 they swiftly 
voted to buy from themselves 11,513 shares of Halifax Electric Tramway 
stock (held in the name of Nova Scotia Light and Power Company of Mont-
real) for $203.50 per share. Since this stock had been acquired by Nova Scotia 
Light and Power for between $165 and $170 per share, this represented a 
profit of $404,100.50.94 In addition they received all 25,000 common shares 
of the new company, Nova Scotia Tramways and Power, shares which carried 
with them managerial control. The $2,250,000 in bonds which they acquired 
at $90 each were promptly offered for sale by underwriters in Boston and 
New York at $95.50, or a profit of $123,750 (from which commissions had, 
of course, to be deducted). The preference stock, with a face value of 
$1,500,000 but acquired for $75 per share, was sold at par with a bonus of 
three common shares for every ten preference purchased, or a profit of 
$195,000 after the book value of the common stock bonus (4500 shares at 
$40 each) had been deducted.95 The sale of these securities thus netted the 
syndicate $3,648,750, of which $3,150,000 was owed back to Nova Scotia 
Tramways and Power, leaving them with a profit of $318,750. Added to the 
$404,100.50 gain on the Halifax Tramways share purchase this represented 
a gross profit on the securities transactions of $722,850.50, to which might 
be added at least $78,415 from the time when the individual syndicate mem-
bers had sold their Tramway stock to Nova Scotia Light and Power in 1912, 
or a grand total of $801,265.50. Since the Gaspereau lands had actually cost 
Robert only $100,000 in cash, but were now valued at $300,000 by the P.U.C., 
this meant a further gain of $200,000, which brought the total gross profit 
up to the nice round sum of at least $1,001,265.50.96 
Happily for the syndicate members this was not all, for they still retained 
20,500 (82%) of the common shares of the new Nova Scotia Tramways and 
Power Company, a company whose assets were now valued at $7,446,668 and 
whose earning power was solidly underpinned by the Halifax street railway 
of which both the gross and net earnings had reached new highs in 1916.97 
In its first year of existence Nova Scotia Tramways was in a position to pay 
94 Directors' meeting, 9 January 1917; Special general meeting of shareholders, 9 January 
1917; Directors' meeting, 10 January 1917, Nova Scotia Tramways and Power Company 
Minute Book 1, Nova Scotia Power Corporation. 
95 Ibid.; details of the public offering of securities are contained in Canadian Railway and 
Marine World (February, 1917), p. 68. 
96 In addition, the syndicate had received $92,000 annually in dividends on their Tramway 
stock over the preceding 4 years; even if the money to purchase the stock was borrowed at, 
say, 6%, this would have meant almost $100,000 in additional profits. 
97 Canadian Railway and Marine World (February, 1917), p. 68. 
Acadiensis 129 
6.5% on its common stock after the bond interest and preference dividends 
had been met. Moreover, with control of Halifax Electric Tramways went 
access to the $1,002,884 in its surplus account at the end of 1915. How this 
surplus was used is not clear, but what is known is that at the end of 1917 
Nova Scotia Tramways had only $7,199.54 in its surplus account.98 Whether 
these funds were used to purchase the 2487 outstanding shares of Halifax 
Tramway stock for $203.50 each ($506,104) and to redeem the $600,000 worth 
of bonds, or for some other purpose, it meant that the syndicate was not 
required to put up any more cash." And most fortunately of all, like true 
Canadian entrepreneurs, they were in a position to sell their controlling 
interest in Nova Scotia Tramways to a group of Americans in 1919 for a 
further profit of undisclosed size.100 All in all, then, the promoters had every 
reason to congratulate themselves on their coup. 
The citizens of Halifax, however, had little to celebrate. Indeed, it might be 
said that the promoters administered to them a "tweaking" far more severe, 
more longlasting and more painful than that suffered by Senator Dennis' 
proboscis. The ostensible purpose of the merger was to permit the develop-
ment of hydroelectricity on the Gaspereau and the distribution of this 
cheaper light and power within the city of Halifax. But nothing came of 
that. From the very outset the directors of Nova Scotia Tramways and Power 
twisted and squirmed to get out of their commitment to begin developing the 
Gaspereau, and in 1917 they succeeded in procuring from the legislature an 
extension of the deadline for starting work from 1916 to 1919.101 The funds 
raised for this purpose were promptly channelled out of Nova Scotia and lent 
to Montreal Tramways and Power Company, another undertaking controlled 
by Robert.102 Indeed, Robert must have known from the outset, as an ex-
perienced electrical utilities' executive, that the difficulty and expense of 
developing the Gaspereau, added to the serious doubts about the adequacy 
of the stream flow, made a successful installation highly problematical. That 
the real purpose of the takeover of the street railway was a financial specu-
98 Annual Financial Review, vol. XVI (Toronto, 1916), p. 606. 
99 If, as seems likely, the surplus was used for this purpose, or to provide the working capital 
for the new company, the profits reaped by the syndicate would be greater by over $1,000,000. 
100 Second annual general meeting of shareholders, 31 March 1919, Nova Scotia Tramways and 
Power Company Minute Book 1, Nova Scotia Power Corporation. If all 20,500 shares had 
been sold for their nominal 1917 price of $40 apiece, the additional profit would have been 
$820,000 plus accrued dividends. 
101 Directors' meeting, 21 February, 23 March 1917, Nova Scotia Tramways and Power Company 
Minute Book 1, Nova Scotia Power Corporation,- Nova Scotia, Statutes, 1917, c. 183 amended 
sec. 32 of c. 180, 1914 which bound the company to spend $500,000 on development within 
two years, and extended the deadline for starting work to five years. 
102 Directors' meeting, 15 April 1917, Nova Scotia Tramways and Power Company Minute 
Book 1, Nova Scotia Power Corporation. 
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lation is indicated by the fact that he apparently never approached the 
Halifax Development Company, which possessed a relatively easily developed 
power site within 20 miles of the city at the Head of St. Margaret's Bay, either 
with a view to a takeover or to purchasing power. When Boston interests 
acquired control of the company in 1919 they lost little time in applying to the 
legislature to have the charter provision requiring them to invest money in 
developing the Gaspereau deleted altogether.103 When hydroelectricity came 
to Halifax in June 1922, it came not because of the activities of Nova Scotia 
Tramways and Power, but because the provincial Power Commission took 
over the development at St. Margaret's Bay and completed it. The company 
then became a distributor for the public agency.104 
In their dealings with Nova Scotians E. A. Robert and his friends showed 
that they were men who knew a great deal about getting their own way. In 
1909 they set out to gain control of an electrical utilities monopoly in the 
province's capital. Such an undertaking would have been solidly profitable 
in its own right, particularly if cheap hydroelectricity were substituted for 
relatively expensive steam power. But these men, like promoters in other Ca-
nadian cities, were not satisfied simply with operating profits; they wanted 
the vastly greater speculative returns offered by a merger and a recapitaliza-
tion. Thus they had first to deal with rival entrepreneurs, then to oust the 
management from control of the street railway, while all the time pressing 
their case with the city and the province. That they attained their objectives 
was less a measure of their business acumen than of their ability to command 
political influence. Sir Frederick Borden's presence in the syndicate was 
symbolic of this: he could be relied upon to deliver the necessary Liberal 
votes. The "grab" for Halifax succeeded only through the acquiescence of 
Premier Murray. While idealists might argue that he acted out of ideological 
hostility to public ownership in encouraging Robert's schemes, it is difficult 
to see why he should have alienated his own followers from Halifax as well 
as local politicians, when he could have thrown his weight behind the plan 
to have an independent concern, like the Halifax Development Company, 
generate hydroelectricity and transmit it to the city for sale to the street 
railway and to other light and power users. Political influence, perhaps 
cemented by financial generosity, seems the most plausible explanation for 
his behaviour, and it was this that enabled Robert to outflank irate citizens 
and municipal officials. 
And the "tweaks" which Robert proceeded to administer to the city were 
not soon forgotten. First, he ousted local people from control of the street 
103 Directors' meeting, 19 June 1920, Nova Scotia Tramways and Power Company Minute 
Book 2, Nova Scotia Power Corporation. 
104 We intend to deal with this subject in a forthcoming paper. 
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railway and ultimately handed it over to a group of Bostonians and New 
Yorkers. Secondly, he blocked the city's effort to buy him out at a fair price 
in 1913 through his influence with the provincial government. Thirdly, he was 
able to push through legislation authorizing the merger in 1914 despite the 
outspoken opposition of most citizens. Fourthly, he used his control of Nova 
Scotia Tramways and Power to load it up with so much debt that it would be 
almost impossible for the city to raise the money to buy out the company in 
future. And that very load of debt justified the retention of high electricity 
rates and tram fares. Fifthly, the syndicate made large profits on the deal and 
still retained control of the company. But they did not use that control to 
develop hydroelectricity on the Gaspereau and pass on the advantages of 
cheap power to the city of Halifax. Instead, they set out systematically to 
evade their obligations, so that a provincial commission had to be set up in 
1919 to undertake the very task which had been given as the raison d'etre of 
the merger. These experiences must have confirmed every Haligonian's 
prejudices about what to expect from a Montrealer. 
